Water And Warfare
Water And Warfare
Sidra Sadizai
In the geopolitical context of South Asia, water—the most essential resource for life—has turned into a tactical weapon. There is currently a great deal of strain on the long-standing water-sharing agreements between India and Pakistan. While headlines are dominated by territorial disputes like Kashmir, a more subdued but no less deadly war is being fought over rivers, dams, and the control of water that sustains life. India’s actions regarding the Indus River system pose a threat to Pakistan’s survival as well as its economy and agriculture. Legal frameworks, international pressure, and regional diplomacy are all necessary to combat and resolve this type of “water warfare.”
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which was mediated by the World Bank and signed in 1960, split the six rivers of the Indus basin between India and Pakistan. India kept the eastern rivers, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, while Pakistan was given the western rivers, the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. The treaty, which is frequently cited as an example of effective conflict resolution, has largely held up despite wars and hostilities.
But India has been taking advantage of the treaty’s shortcomings more and more in recent years. India is threatening Pakistan’s agriculture, hydropower production, and food security by rapidly constructing dams and hydroelectric projects on rivers that flow into Pakistan, changing the water’s natural flow and timing.
India’s Diplomacy on Dams
Numerous hydroelectric projects on the western rivers are presently being planned or built by India; this is allowed by the treaty, but only under very specific restrictions. Projects like the dams at Baglihar, Kishanganga, and Ratle have grown to be significant sources of conflict. Pakistan has expressed worries that these dams go against the treaty’s rules regarding flow control and water storage.
For example, water that would naturally flow into Pakistan-administered Kashmir is diverted by the Kishanganga project on the Neelum River, a tributary of the Jhelum. India proceeded with its plans in spite of Pakistan’s protests and a 2013 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling mandating minimum downstream flow, which changed the dynamics of the river and had an effect on Neelum Valley agriculture.
Serious concerns are also raised by the Ratle project, which is currently under construction on the Chenab River. Pakistan contends that India can effectively use water as a geopolitical lever by modifying water flow during crucial planting seasons thanks to its designs. Such conduct is tantamount to weaponising water and goes beyond legal rights.
Climate Stress and Strategic Chokehold
India’s water infrastructure encompasses more than just energy. India obtains a strategic chokehold by increasing its authority over the headwaters of rivers that flow into Pakistan. This is concerning in times of peace. It turns into a weapon during wartime. This has been alluded to by Indian officials. The spirit, if not the letter, of the IWT was broken in 2019 when Indian ministers openly discussed “stopping Pakistan’s share of water” in the wake of the Pulwama attack.
This threat is made worse by climate change. Water scarcity, unpredictable rainfall, and glacial melt are problems for both nations. India’s unilateral actions exacerbate regional water insecurity rather than fostering cooperative management. This puts Pakistan, which is already among the world’s most water-stressed nations, at risk.
Effects on Pakistan
For Pakistan, the stakes are extremely high. The Indus basin provides irrigation for about 90% of Pakistan’s agricultural output. The Chenab and Jhelum waters are crucial to Punjab, Pakistan’s food basket. Crops, livelihoods, and food prices will all suffer if these rivers are disrupted, delayed, or diverted.
Downstream communities in areas like Sindh and Balochistan deal with desertification, saltwater intrusion, and dwindling water supplies. This is a humanitarian crisis in the making, not just a bilateral problem.
Legal and Diplomatic Conflicts
Pakistan has voiced its concerns in international fora, but received little response. As an IWT guarantor, the World Bank has occasionally been reluctant to step in out of concern for Indian retaliation. International courts have seen sluggish and frequently inconclusive legal battles.
India presents itself as a responsible upper riparian nation diplomatically, but its behaviour betrays a different picture. There is a growing belief that India employs water as a subtle, debatable, yet devastating component of its hybrid warfare strategy.
The Path Ahead
Pakistan needs to use a multifaceted approach to counter India’s water manoeuvring: 1. Diplomatic Engagement: Use the UN, OIC, and World Bank in particular to exert international pressure to ensure adherence to the IWT and stop India from unilaterally changing river flows. 2. Legal Recourse: Wherever treaty violations take place, seek arbitration and court decisions. Pakistan’s legal position has been strengthened by recent rulings, which need to be taken advantage of. 3. Water Management Reforms: To lessen vulnerability, Pakistan must invest in storage and conservation, modernise its water infrastructure, and cut waste.
4. Track and Monitor: Set up impartial, scientific oversight of dam operations and river flows. Evidence and transparency are essential for establishing a case abroad. 5. Public Awareness: Educate the public on the water crisis and how India is contributing to its worsening. A knowledgeable populace is better equipped to support water conservation efforts and demand action.
In conclusion
Water ought to bring people together rather than separate them. However, India’s current stance runs the risk of making neighbours into enemies and rivers into weapons. Pakistan must react forcefully and sensibly, but it is also willing to work with others, but not at the expense of its survival or sovereignty.
India has a shortsighted approach to water warfare. The only viable course of action in a region on the verge of climate collapse is cooperation, not coercion.



